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DIFFERENTIAL POWER ANALYSIS ATTACK ON
A FPGA IMPLEMENTATION OF TEA
SUMMARY
The Tiny Encryption Algorithm(TEA) is a symmetric key encryption algorithm
invented by David Wheeler and Roger Needham, members of the Computer Security
Laboratory of Cambridge University. There are two main attack kinds against TEA.
One of them is pure mathematical attacks that use intensive mathematical techniques
for known or chosen input-output pairs of the encryption to reveal the secret key. The
other one is side channel attacks (SCA) that an attacker use the information that leaked
from the physical implementation of TEA during the encryption or decryption. These
leaked information can be power consumption, execution time, electromagnetic waves,
heat, and frequency. SCA is a powerful class of attacks which is particularly effective
against embedded system implementation of cryptography, so it can be used to get the
key that used for smart cards or prepaid cards that have cryptographic modules.
There are some kinds of SCA. For example, in the aspect of accessing the
cryptographic module, SCA can be divided into two branch such as invasive attack
and non-invasive attack. In invasive attack the adversary has a direct physical access
to the device and an ability to make some changes on device. On the other hand, SCA
can be divided two according to methods used in the analysis process, such as simple
side channel attack (SSCA) and differential side channel attack (DSCA). In SSCA, the
adversary examine and try to find the relationship between side channel output and the
cryptographic operation by using just single trace. On the other hand, In DSCA, the
adversary uses some statistical methods to find the correlation between the processed
data and the side channel output. Unlike SSCA, lots of measurements are used and the
adversary create a model of the pyhsical device to create the hypothetical side channel
output. One branch of side channel attacks is Differential Power Analysis (DPA),
where the attacker use the power consumption of the cryptographic device to reveal
the secret key. Complementary-Metal-Oxide-Semiconductor (CMOS) technology is
used in nearly every digital circuits. If a CMOS gate changes its state, this change
causes current consumption which can be measured. We can use this information for
DPA because there is a linear ratio between the power dissipation and the amount of
the state change.
We used a Sasebo GII board for implementation of TEA because it can measure the
power consumption of the Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA) that has TEA.
Then we follow the steps for DPA. First of all, we decide to a register to attack.
However, the registers in the original architecture are not suitable for DPA, so we add
some registers for DPA attack. Then we measure the power consumption for known
plaintexts. After that, we calculate the hypothetical intermediate values for the register
that we attack. We convert hypothetical intermediate values to the hypothetical power
values by using Hamming Distance Power Model. Finally, we calculate the correlation
xvii
between the power consumption of TEA and the power estimation related to the part
of the key.
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TEA UYGULAMASININ FPGA GERÇEKLEMELERI˙NE KARS¸I
DI˙FERANSI˙YEL GÜÇ ANALI˙ZI˙ SALDIRISI
ÖZET
Radyo Frekansı ile Tanımlama (RFID) teknolojisi, radyo frekansı kullanarak nesneleri
tanıma, nesnelerden bilgi toplama yöntemidir. Bir RFID sisteminde üç temel unsur
vardır. Bunlar etiket, okuyucu ve bilgisayardır. Etiket, üzerinde kendine has
bir bir çes¸it numara barındıran bir çes¸it otomatik tanıma aygıtıdır. Okuyucu ise
etrafındaki etiketlerin varlıg˘ının farkına varabilen ve bu etiketlerden bilgiyi alarak
bilgisayara kaydedebilen bir cihazdır. Bilgisayar ise genellikle sistemde etiketler ile
ilgili bilgileri depolama is¸levine sahiptir. Etiket ile okuyucu arasındaki haberles¸me
radyo frekansı kullanılarak yapılır, bu yüzden bu haberles¸menin güvenli yapılması
gerekmektedir. Küçük S¸ifreleme Algoritması (Tiny Encryption Algorithm-TEA)
haberles¸menin güvenli yapılması için seçilmis¸tir.
TEA hızlı ve donanımsal olarak fazla alana ihtiyaç duymayan bir algoritmadır. Bu
yüzden etiketler için uygundur. Algoritma genel olarak, alınan 64 bitlik bir veriyi
s¸ifreleyerek yine 64 bitlik bir veri elde etmektedir. Bu esnada 128 bitlik bir anahtar
kullanır. Bu algoritmada güvenlik bir fonksiyonun tekrar tekrar uygulanması ile
sag˘lanmıs¸tır. Bir s¸ifreleme için 32 çevrim gerekmektedir. Algoritma her bir çevrimde
aynı fonksiyonu iki kez uygular. Bu fonksiyon içerisinde toplama, özel veya ve sag˘a
sola kaydırma is¸lemleri vardır. Bu is¸lemlerin donanımsal olarak tasarlanması kolaydır
ve pek güvenli deg˘ildir. Fakat 32 çevrimden sonra is¸lemler basit olsa da algoritma
güvenli hale gelmektedir. Ayrıca bu algoritma daha önceden tanımlanmıs¸ veri blokları
kullanmaz, bu sayede daha hızlı olur ve büyük alanlara ihtiyaç duymaz.
S¸ifreleme algoritması kullanılmasındaki en temel amaç, bilginin güvenlig˘idir. Bir
algoritmanın güvenli olup olmadıg˘ını sorgulayan alana kriptanaliz denmektedir. Bu
sorgulama iki s¸ekilde olur. I˙lkinde kriptografik sistem bir matematiksel model olarak
düs¸ünülür ve giris¸ verileri ile çıkıs¸ verileri matematiksel yöntemlerle incelenerek
gizli anahtar elde edilmeye çalıs¸ılır. Fakat bu yöntem günümüzdeki gelis¸en kodlama
standartlarına kars¸ı pratikte kullanılması zordur. Dig˘er bir yöntem ise yan kanal analizi
yöntemidir. Bu yöndem kriptolojik algoritmayı barındıran sistemin, bu algoritmayı
çalıs¸tırırken dıs¸arı verdig˘i bilgileri kullanarak gizli anahtarı elde etmeye çalıs¸ır. Bu
bilgiler sistemin harcadıg˘ı güç bilgisi, dıs¸arıya yaydıg˘ı manyetik radyasyon bilgisi,
ses bilgisi, ısı bilgisi, algoritmayı gerçekles¸tirmek için gerekli zaman bilgisi, frekans
bilgisi gibi çes¸itli alanlarda olabilmektedir.
Yan kanal analizleri, saldıran kis¸inin yeteneklerine bag˘lı olarak ikiye ayrılabilmektedir.
Eg˘er saldıran kis¸inin cihaza dog˘rudan fiziksel etkisi olabiliyor ve cihaz üzerinde
istedig˘i dog˘rultuda deg˘is¸iklikler yapabiliyorsa bu çes¸it ataklara aktif yan kanal analizi
saldırılası yöntemi denir. Pasif yan kanal analizi saldırısında ise devrenin normal
çalıs¸ma düzenine etki edilmez, sadece devrenin dıs¸arıya istemsiz olarak verdig˘i
bilgilerden yararlanılır. Yan kanal analizleri ayrıca, anahtarı elde etmek için kullanılan
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yöntem bakımından da Basit Analiz Saldırısı ve Farksal Analiz Saldırısı olmak
üzere ikiye ayrılır. Basit analiz saldırısında sadece bir ölçüme bakılarak anahtar
hakkında bilgi edinmeye çalıs¸ılır. Farksal analiz saldırısında ise ölçüm sayısı mümkün
oldug˘unca arttırılarak bu veriler matematiksel yöntemlerle incelenir ve anahtar elde
edilmeye çalıs¸ılır. Ayrıca farksal analiz saldırılarında, saldırılan algoritmanın es¸lenig˘i
olan varsayımsal bir algoritma olus¸turulur ve bu algoritma kullanılarak varsayımsal
sonuçlar elde edilir. Yani saldırı iki as¸amada yapılır, ilk önce gerçek ölçüm yapılır,
daha sonra ise bilgisayarda öngörülü analiz gerçekles¸tirilir. Basit analiz saldırısında
algoritmanın yaptıg˘ı is¸lemler ile güç harcaması arasındaki bag˘lantı kullanılırken,
farksal analiz saldırısında algoritmanın is¸ledig˘i veri ile harcadıg˘ı güç arasındaki
ilis¸kiden yola çıkılarak anahtar elde edilmeye çalıs¸ılır.
Biz TEA uygulamasının Sahada Programlanabilir Kapı Dizileri (Field Programmable
Gate Arrays-FPGA) gerçeklemesi üzerine diferansiyel güç analizi saldırısı gerçek-
les¸tirdik. Bunun için öncelikle deney düzeneg˘ini hazırladık. Deney düzeneg˘i
bilgisayar, Sasebo GII kartı ve osiloskoptan olus¸maktadır. Sasebo GII kartı üzerinde
iki adet FPGA bulunmaktadır. Bunlardan biri kriptolojik algoritmanın gerçeklenmesi
için kart üzerinde bulunmaktadır. Kart bu FPGA’nın harcadıg˘ı gücü ölçebilmektedir.
Dig˘er FPGA ise kriptolojik algoritmanın oldug˘u FPGA’nın kontrolünü sag˘lamak ve
ona saat sinyali göndermek için kart üzerinde bulunmaktadır. Daha sonra kart ile
osiloskop arasındaki iletis¸imi, karttan gelen güç verilerini ölçebilmek için sag˘ladık. En
sonunda ise bilgisayarın hem osiloskop ile hem de kart ile iletis¸imini sag˘ladık. Çünkü
bilgisayar hem karta gerektig˘inde s¸ifreleme için gerekli verileri gönderecek hem de
kartın çalıs¸masını kontrol edecektir. Ayrıca osiloskoptaki güç verilerinin de bilgisayar
tarafından alınması ve farksal analiz saldırısı için kullanılması gerekmektedir. Tüm bu
iletis¸imi sag˘lamak için bilgisayarda Matlab programı kullanıldı.
Diferansiyel gün analizi saldırısının belirli adımları vardır. I˙lk olarak algoritma
üzerinde saldırı yapılacak yerin seçilmesi gerekmektedir. Bu esnada algoritma
incelenmeli ve saldırıya en uygun yer seçilmelidir. I˙kinci adımda ise, saldırı yapan
kis¸i algoritmayı gerçek zamanlı çalıs¸tırır ve algoritmanın harcadıg˘ı gücü ölçer ve
kaydeder. Buradaki önemli nokta harcanan gücün hangi girdiye ait olundug˘unun
saldırı yapan kis¸i tarafından bilinmesidir. Üçüncü adımda, saldırı yapan kis¸i ikinci
adımda kullandıg˘ı girdileri kendi olus¸turdug˘u varsayımsal algoritma için girdi olarak
kullanır. Bu adımdaki önemli nokta ise bu girdileri olabilecek tüm anahtar deg˘erleri
ile birlikte varsayımsal algoritmada is¸lemektir. Böylelikle saldırı yapan kis¸inin elinde
her bir girdi için olabilecek tüm çıktılar bulunmaktadır. Dördüncü adımda ise üçüncü
adımda elde ettig˘i varsayımsal sonuçları varsayımsal güç verilerine dönüs¸türür. Bu
esnada bazı güç teorilerinden faydalanabilir. Son as¸amada ise ikinci as¸amada elde
edilen güç ölçüm sonuçları ile dördüncü as¸amada elde edilen varsayımsal güç verileri
arasındaki korelasyon hesaplanır. Korelasyonun mutlak deg˘eri en fazla 1 en düs¸ük
ise 0 olabilmektedir. Bu deg˘er ne kadar büyük ise iki veri arasındaki ilis¸ki o derecede
orantılıdır. Dog˘ru anahtar için hesaplanan korelasyon deg˘erinin en büyük deg˘er olması
ve 1’e yakın olması gerekmektedir.
TEA için bir girdinin güç ölçümünün yapılması için s¸u adımlar uygulanmaktadır.
Matlab’tan 64 bitlik is¸lenecek veri FPGA’ya gönderilir. FPGA bu veriyi alır
ve sorunsuz bir s¸ekilde bu veriyi aldıg˘ını Matlab’a 3 deg˘erinde veri göndererek
söyler. Daha sonra Matlab FPGA’ya 1 deg˘erinde veri göndererek s¸ifreleme is¸lemine
bas¸lamasını söyler. Bu komutu alan FPGA, s¸ifrelemeye bas¸lar ve aynı anda osiloskoba
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da s¸ifrelemeye bas¸ladıg˘ını belirten bir sinyal gönderir. Bu sinyali farkeden osiloskop
ölçüme bas¸lar. S¸ifreleme is¸lemi bittig˘inde FPGA Matlaba 255 deg˘erinde bir veri
gönderir ve Matlab bu veriyi aldıktan sonra osiloskoptan güç ölçümü verileri alır.
Böylelikle bilgisayarda bilinen bir girdi için harcanan güç saklanmıs¸ olur.
Diferansiyel güç analizi için 1000 adet 64 bitlik s¸ifrelenmesi için veri olus¸turuldu.
Bu olus¸turulan veri P matrisine kondu. Daha sonra her bir veri için güç ölçümü
yapıldı ve kayıt altına alında. Her bir güç ölçümünde 1000 tane veri bulunmaktadır.
Bu yüzden güç ölçümleri 1000 satırlık 1000 sütunluk bir matrise kaydedildi. Daha
sonra varsayımsal olarak s¸ifreleme algoritması Matlab programında üretildi. Saldırı
yapılacak noktanın olabilecek tüm anahtar deg˘erleri ve P matrisinde yer alan tüm
s¸ifrelenecek veriler için alacag˘ı deg˘erler hesaplandı. Kaydedicinin 8 bitlik en düs¸ük
dereceli kısmına saldırı yapıldıg˘ı için 256 çes¸it anahtar olabilir. Bu yüzden varsayımsal
olarak elde edilen veriler 1000 satırlık 2048 sütunluk bir matriste saklandı. Bir
sonraki adım olarak varsayımsal verilerin varsayımlar güç verilerine dönüs¸türüldü. Bu
esnada Hamming uzaklıg˘ı metodu kullanıldı. Böylelikle 1000 satırlık 256 sütunluk
bir matris elde edildi. Daha sonra bu matris ile P matrisi arasındaki korelasyon
hesaplandı. Sonuç olarak dog˘ru anahtar 0.1 korelasyon deg˘erini alarak en büyük
korelasyon deg˘erine sahip çıktı fakat bu deg˘er istenilen seviyenin altındadır. Çünkü
algoritmada bu esnada 300 civarında bit daha is¸lem yapılmaktadır. Güç ölçümü tüm
bitler için oldug˘undan, 8 bitlik varsayımsal güç tüketiminden hesaplanan korelasyon
deg˘eri istenildig˘i seviyede deg˘ildir. Bu yüzden deg˘is¸ebilecek bit sayısının azalması
durumunda korelasyon deg˘erinin deg˘is¸imini gözlemlemek için algoritma üzerinde
deg˘is¸iklik yapıldı. Algoritmada sadece saldırı yapılacak yer bırakıldı ve dig˘er
yerler algoritmadan atıldı. Bu durumda yukarıdaki adımlar tekrar edildi ve bu
durumda dog˘ru anahtar için 0.45 civarında korelasyon deg˘eri elde edildi. Çünkü
yeni durumda deg˘is¸ebilecek bit sayısı 32 oldug˘u için 8 bitlik varsayımsal veriler ile
daha büyük korelasyon deg˘erleri elde edildi. Ayrıca korelasyon deg˘erleri ile ilgili bir
bas¸ka problem ise her 16 muhtemel anahtar deg˘erleri için aynı korelasyon deg˘erleri
elde edilmesidir. Bunun nedeni algoritmada, girilen verinin öncelikle sola 4 kez
kaydırılması ve yeni gelen bitlerin deg˘erinin 0 olmasıdır. Böylece tüm girdilerin en
düs¸ük dereceli 4 biti aynı deg˘eri alır.
Bu tezden önce literatürde TEA uygulamasının FPGA gerçeklemelerine kars¸ı
diferansiyel güç analizi saldırısı yapılmamıs¸tı. Bu çalıs¸ma kendi alanında bir ilktir.
Elde edilen korelasyon deg˘eri istenilen seviyede olmamakla beraber dig˘er korelasyon
deg˘erlerine göre daha büyüktür. Gerçek anahtar kesin olarak belirlenememis¸ ama
bulundug˘u grup belirlenebilmis¸tir.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The communication has been important since the begining of the human history
and it will always important [1]. In any communication kind, there are three basic
components as a sender, a message and a receiver like Figure 1.1. Sometimes, the
sender wants to send a message that is not to be known by the people except from the
receiver. Therefore, the cryptography became important for the people [1].
The information that sender wants to send to the receiver is called plaintext and the
sender first encrypts the plaintext with a predetermined key before sending it. The
output of the encryption is called ciphertext. An ordinary people can not understand
the information because the key and the encryption way are not known. On the other
hand, the receiver who knows the encryption way and the key can get the information
by decrypting the ciphertext.
This cryptosystem can be defined with mathematical notations as below [2].
A cryptosystem is a five-tuple (P,C,K,E,C), where the following conditions are
satisfied:
• P is a finete set of possible plaintexts
• C is a finite set of possible ciphertexts
• K, the keyspace, is a finite set of possible keys
Encryption Decryption
Eve
Ka Kb
 Message Message
Alice Bob
Figure 1.1: A basic cryptographic model
1
• For each κ ∈K, there is an encryption rule ek ∈ E and a corresponding decryption
rule dk ∈D. Each ek :P→C and dk :C→P are functions such that dk (ek (x)) = x
for every plaintext x ∈ P.
Cryptography provides the following services: confidentiality, data integrity, entity
authentication, non-repudiation and data origin authentication [1].
• Confidentiality means that the information can be known by the people who are
authorized to have it. It can be achieved with physical protection and mathematical
algorithms which render data unintelligible.
• Data integrity means that the receiver can understand the unauthorized alteration of
the information.
• Authentication means the identification of the parts in the communication system.
The sender and the receiver should identify each other and also the message should
be checked whether or not it is the original message. Therefore authentication
is subdivided into two major classes: entity authentication and data origin
authentication.
• Non-repudiation secures the previous communication contents for any entities. It
prevents an entity from denying previous commitments or actions.
1.1 Motivation
Until now, cryptograyphy is examined, but there is another field called cryptanalysis.
Cryptanalysis can be defined as the study of techniques to analyze and break a
cryptographic algorithms [3]. Cryptanalysis can be divided into two classes as
classical cryptanalysis and side-channel analysis attack. In side-channel analysis
attack, the attacker uses the information that gained from the physical implementation
of a cryptosystem. On the other hand, in classical cryptanalysis, the attacker takes
advantages of the weaknesses of the algorithm by using known or chosen input-output
pairs of the encryption function to reveal the secret key information.
The Tiny Encryption Algorithm (TEA) [4] invented by David Wheeler and Roger
Needham, members of the Computer Security Laboratory of Cambridge University
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in 1995. Until now the side-channel analysis of an implementation of TEA has not
been examined. So we showed that it is possible to get key by applying differential
power analysis attacks.
1.2 Thesis Outline and Contributions
In Chapter 2, we introduced the notation of the Tiny Encryption Algorithm and showed
the differences or similarities between TEA and the other cryptographic algorithms.
In Chapter 3, we examined the side-channel attacks in detail and focused on the power
analysis attacks.
In Chapter 4, we showed the measurement setup and how we could measure the power
consumption of the TEA.
In Chapter 5, the data that we measured as the power consumption of TEA were
analyzed and showed the correlation between the power consumption of TEA and the
key.
In Chapter 6, it is the conclusion of the thesis. We briefly summarize what we did and
get.
As we said before, there is no research about side-channel attack over TEA in academic
world so this thesis is important to show the possibility of SCA over TEA.
3
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2. THE TINY ENCRYPTION ALGORITHM
The Tiny Encryption Algorithm is a symmetric key encryption algorithm invented by
David Wheeler and Roger Needham, members of the Computer Security Laboratory
of Cambridge University and also it is called TEA. It firstly was presented in the 1995
in Fast Software Encryption Workshop [4].
TEA is a Feistel cipher [2]. The main common feature for Feistel ciphers are iterations.
The ciphertext is calculated from the plaintext by repeated application of the same
transformation or round function. In a Feistel cipher, firstly the plaintext is split into
two halves. Then, the round function is applied to one part of these halves. The output
of this operation is XORed with the other half. After that, the two halves are swapped.
These applications continues until the last round where there is generally no swap.
The Data Encryption Standart(DES) [5] adopted in 1977 by the National Bureau
of Standards, now The National Institute of Standards and Technology(NIST) was
popular, but it needs large area because of using s-boxes. On the other hand, TEA is
used to minimize memory footprint and maximize speed since it doesn’t use s-boxes
or predefined tables and doesn’t need much initialization time. In addition to them, it
provides Shannon’s properties of diffusion and confusion necessary for a secure block
cipher without the need for predefined tables. It uses operations from mixed algebraic
groups. Therefore it is much simpler and faster. If it is compared with other block
ciphers like DES or Advanced Encryption Standard(AES) [6] in terms of structure, the
hardware implementation of TEA is very simple. Indeed, it was designed for simplicity
and performance, while seeking encryption strength on par with more complicated and
resource-intensive algorithms such as DES.
TEA was initially designed to be an extremely small algorithm when implemented in
terms of the memory footprint required to store the algorithm. This was accomplished
by making the basic operations very simple and weak; security is achieved by repeating
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these simple operations many times. As the basic operations are very simple, TEA is
also regarded as a very high speed encryption algorithm.
2.1 Encryption Routine
The plaintext for TEA should be 64 bits long and it uses 128 bits long key and the
key schedule is simple. It is split into 4 equal size blocks and each of them are
used in order. In the TEA, one bit difference in the one part of the pliantext cause
approximately 32 bit differences in the cipher text. Therefore, it is highly resistant
to differential cryptanalysis. To get ciphertext from the plaintext, 32 rounds need for
TEA. In each round, the same operation is applied to the inputs of the round. TEA
uses only exclusive-or, addition and shift operations.
The abstract structure of TEA encryption can be seen in Figure 2.1. This routine was
written in the C language with key k [0]− k [3] [4] as below. Data in v [0] and v [1].
vo id code ( long ∗ v , l ong ∗ k ) {
u n s i g n e d long y=v [ 0 ] , z=v [ 1 ] , sum = 0 , /∗ s e t up ∗ /
n=32 ;
d e l t a =0 x9e3779b9 , /∗ a key s c h e d u l e c o n s t a n t ∗ /
w h i l e ( n−−> 0 ) { ∗ b a s i c c y c l e s t a r t ∗ /
sum += d e l t a ;
y+= ( ( z < <4)+k [ 0 ] ) ^ ( z+sum ) ^ ( ( z > >5)+k [ 1 ] ) ;
z+= ( ( y < <4)+k [ 2 ] ) ^ ( y+sum ) ^ ( ( y > >5)+k [ 3 ] ) ;
} /∗ end c y c l e ∗ /
v [ 0 ] = y ; v [ 1 ] = z ; }
One round of TEA is shown in Figure 2.2. Mixing the plaintext can be achieved
by using a dual shift operators and the nonlinearity is achieved with XOR and ADD
operators. The key length is 128 bits because it was enough to prevent simple search
techniques being effective.
Because of using shift operators, the top 5 and bottom four bits are probably slightly
weaker than the middle bits. The main reason is that the new bits coming in the shift
operation are zeros so these bits does not effect the output of the XOR operation.
Therefore in this area, the convergence rate is slower. On the other hand, a single
change in plaintext or key can propagate to 32 changes in about 4 iterations with the
usefulness of using shifts and XOR.
The number delta, derived from the golden number is used where
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Figure 2.1: The abstract structure of TEA encryption routine
dˆelta=
(√
5−1
)
231 (2.1)
In each round, different delta value is used so it contributes more convergence.
2.2 Why TEA?
TEA is so short and consists of simple algorithms such as addition, shi f toperator
and exclusiveOR. Therefore, it can be implemented easily in a small area and defined
with different languages and assembly languages. Before coming a conclusion about
the algorithm, some other small algorithms were tried by David Wheeler and Roger
Needham who are inventors of TEA, but neither the fastest nor the shortest were
chosen. The best one was chosen aspect of safety, easy to implementation, not have
specialised tables such as S−box and acceptable performance. [4]. It is safety because
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<< 4
>> 5
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Delta[i]
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Right[i+1]
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Figure 2.2: The abstraction of i-th cycle of TEA
the iterations make it secure enough, and easy to implement because as signified before
it uses simple algorithms. It doesn’t use any specialised tables, thus it doesn’t need
much memory.
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3. SIDE CHANNEL ATTACKS
Side Channel Attacks (SCA) focus on how to get the information leaked from physical
implementation of cryptographic modules during the execution of the algorithm [7]. It
can be seen Figure 3.1. It is a powerful class of attacks which is particularly effective
against embedded system implementation of cryptography, so it can be used to get the
key that used for smart cards or prepaid cards that have cryptographic modules.
The model of side channel attacks assumes that there exists some correlation between
the secret key and side channel information such as timing or power consumption [8]
3.1 Side Channel Attack Types According to Ways of Accessing The Module
3.1.1 Invasive attack
The side channel attacks that an attacker has a direct physical access to the internal
elements of the cryptographic modules are named as invasive attacks [9]. An attacker
can make some changes on cryptographic device and use a kind of specific device in
terms of attack types to make measurement from the cryptographic device.
Unlike invasive attack, if an attacker do not have the ability to induce a physical
damage to the chip or make unauthorized electrical interface connection, it is called
semi-invasive attack. However, an attacker still can involve access to the device like
Encryption Decryption
Eve
Ka Kb
 Message Message
Alice Bob
Sound
Electromagnetic 
Radiation
Visible Light
Heat Power 
Consumption
Frequency
Execution Time
Faulty 
Outputs
Figure 3.1: The cryptographic model including leakage kinds
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using a laser beam to ionize a transistor and thus change the state of the flip-flop that
keeps the device’s state [10].
3.1.2 Non-Invasive attack
There are two kinds of non-invasive attack according to Anderson [9].
3.1.2.1 Local non-invasive attack
In this class of attacks, the attacker should be close enough to investigate or manipulate
the device that performs the cryptographic operation. Trying to find correlation
between the power consumption of the cryptographic device and its key by measuring
the current flow while it performs is an example for local non-invasive attack.
3.1.2.2 Remote attack
In Remote Attack, an attacker needs just observation or manipulation of the device’s
input and output. The timing analysis attack is an example for Remote Attack because
an attacker just observe input, output and the time passed between input and output.
3.2 Side Channel Attack Types According to Controls Over Cryptographic
Module
On the other hand, any attack kind can be named as active or passive type of attack by
considering whether or not the attacker has the control over the computation process
[11]. In passive attacks, the cryptanalysis do not do anything that effect the normal
process of the cryptographic device. The attacker gets the information by observing
to get the key. In the active attacks, the cryptanalysis has some ability that effects the
normal device process such as interfering the device inputs or environment.
3.3 Side Channel Attacks Types According to Methods Used in the Analysis
Process
The data that get from any cryptographic device while it performs can be analysed in
two different methods. These are Simple Side Channel Attack (SSCA) and Differential
Side Channel Attack (DSCA).
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3.3.1 Simple side channel attack
The important thing for SSCA is to find a relationship between side channel output
and the cryptographic operation. The side channel output is about single trace and the
attacker tries to get the secret key by reading from it. However, if the noise is too much
in the measurement, SSCA is not efficient because in a SSCA, the attacker does not
use any method to get the secret key.
3.3.2 Differential side channel attack
In DSCA, an attacker uses some statistical methods to find the correlation between
the processed data and the side channel output. Therefore, lots of measurement are
made and many traces are used to find the secret key. In a DSCA, an attacker design
a hypothetical model of the cryptographic device. Then, an attacker tries to find the
secret key by using the output of the hypothetical model of the cryptographic device
and physical side channel output. Figure 3.2 summarize the DSCA.
Physical Device
Model of the 
Physical Device
Statistical Analysis
Data Noise
Data
Physical Side-Channel 
Output
Hypothetical Side-Channel 
Output
Hypothetical 
Key 
Decision
Figure 3.2: The model of DSCA
3.4 Known Side Channel Attacks
Side Channel Attacks can be divided into according to its leakage sources or its
methods. Well known side channel attacks can be listed such as timing attacks
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[12],power analysis attack [8], electromagnetic attacks [13, 14], fault attacks [15],
acoustic attacks [8].
In timing attack, the adversary needs just a simple chronometer to measure how
much time pass between input and output. Therefore it has a very wide application
range. Power analysis attack relies on measurements of the power consumption while
the cryptographic device performs. Similarly, the cryptographic device emits some
electromagnetic radiations and these radiations depend on individual operations and
the knowledge of the operation sequence may reveal the secret key itself. Fault Attack
is about to manipulate or injecting a fault at the appropriate time during the process and
then observing the result and exploiting the erroneous result or unexpected behaviour.
3.5 Power Analysis Attack
Complementary-Metal-Oxide-Semiconductor(CMOS) technology is used widely for
digital circuits and a CMOS circuit consists of lots of logic cells. The total power
consumption of a CMOS circuit is the sum of static power and dynamic power [16], as
shown in Equation3.1.
Ptotal = Pstatic+Pdynamic (3.1)
Static power consumption is computed as Equation3.2, where Ileak is the device
leakage current and VDD is the supply voltage.
Pstatic = Ileak ∗VDD (3.2)
The leakage current of static CMOS circuit is sum of all the leakage current of logic
gates and they are depend on their input values [17]. Lets assume that there are
m bits register and each bits of register depends on the value of the corresponding
input. Each bit can be hold on two position as logic high or logic low so in both
state, different leakage current flows. They can be named as high level leakage current
IH when the corresponding input bit is high logic, low level leakage current IL when
the corresponding input bit is low logic. Therefore, the number of bits having a high
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leakage current IH equals to the Hamming weight w of the input. The overall leakage
current can be shown as Equation3.3.
Ileak,TOT = w · IH+(m− v) · IL = w · (IH− IL)+m · IL (3.3)
From Equation 3.3, there is a linear correlation between the Hamming weight of the
input and the leakage current. However, in a cryptographic device, there can be some
other blocks that are not directly involved in cryptographic operation. Even this parts
also effects the overall leakage current, there is still a correlation between the Hamming
weight and overall leakage current.
On the other hand dynamic power consumption is computed as Equation 3.4 [1],
where PT is the transient power consumption, and PL is the capacitive-load power
consumption.
Pdynamic = PT +PL (3.4)
The transient power consumption is about the current that flows only when the
transistors of CMOS circuit are switching from one logic state to another because at
that time the circuit needs the current to charge the internal nodes (switching current)
and also the through current flows from VCC to GND when the p-channel transistor
and n-channel transistor turn on briefly at the same time during the logic transition.
The transient power consumption is effected from the frequency at which the device is
switching, the rise and fall times of the input signal and internal nodes of the device.
If the input changes fast, the through current is negligible compared to the switching
current.
Transient power consumption is computed as Equation3.5, where Cpd is dynamic
power-dissipation capacitance, VCC is supply voltage, fI is input signal frequency and
NSW is the number of bits switching.
PT =Cpd×V 2CC× fI×NSW (3.5)
The capacitive-Load Power is used to charge external load capacitance and it is
dependent on switching frequency and calculated as Equation3.6, whereCL is external
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(load) capacitance, VCC is supply voltage, fO is output signal frequency and NSW is the
number of bits switching. However, this equation is valid if all outputs have the same
load and are switching at the same output frequency.
PL =CL×V 2CC× fO×NSW (3.6)
If different loads and different output frequencies at all outputs, Equation3.7 is used,
where ∑ is sum of n different frequencies and loads at n different outputs, fOn is
all different output frequencies at each output, numbered 1 through n (Hz), VCC is
supply voltage (V ) and CLn is all different load capacitances at each output, numbered
1 through n.
PL =∑(CLn× fOn)×V 2CC (3.7)
An adversary can get lots of information from the power consumption of the
cryptographic device to find out the secret key. Power analysis attack is particularly
effective and proven successful in attacking smart cards or other dedicated embedded
systems storing the secret key [18–21].
Power Analysis Attack can be divided into two classes in terms of the method that an
adversary choose as SPA and DPA attacks were introduced in 1999 by Kocher [8].
Simple Power Analysis (SPA), where the attacker analyzes one single power trace for
revealing the secret key or device’s operation. It can be used to break cryptographic
implementations in which the execution path depends on the data being processed.
Thus, conditional statements in the code could provide valuable opportunities for SPA.
There is no need any statistical knowledge to be able to do SPA.
In a Differential Power Analysis (DPA), firstly the adversary monitors the power
consumed by the cryptographic device, and then statistically analyses the collected
data to extract the secret key in contrary to SPA. The principle of DPA is to guess the
value of some bits of the secret key and verify the validity of the assumption with the
collected power traces.
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The secret key can be revealed by DPA, but there are some steps for it. They can be
listed as below.
3.5.1 Choosing an intermediate result of the executed algorithm
An attacker starts DPA with choosing an intermediate result of the cryptographic
algorithm [1]. A cryptanalysist should know some knowledge about the information
that cryptographic algorithm executes. It can be the plaintext, ciphertext or any
information that can be useful. In addition, an attacker should know the algorithm
because an intermediate result is calculated by using the algorithm, the possible keys
and the information that known by the attacker.
3.5.2 Measuring the power consumption
The second step of a DPA attack is to measure the power consumption of the
cryptographic device while encryption or decryption for known data value. Lets
call N different data blocks for known data values and each of these data blocks
are L bits long. The attacker should know data blocks for each of this power
consumption because intermediate result is calculated according to them. It can be
signified as a matrix P = (p(1), p(2), ...., p(N))′, where p(i) means the known data
value in the ith encryption or decryption run. The size of matrix P is N× L. The
attacker measure the power consumption for each of the p(i) so it can be shown
as m(i) = (m(i,1), .....,m(i,T )), where T shows the number of data points for one
measurement. There are N different data blocks so all power measurement values can
be shown as matrix M of size N× T. Thus, an attacker has a matrix shows that the
power consumption of the cryptographic device for each data blocks. We need only
one measurement point for one data block. We calculate S matrix by using the average,
maximum or integral of each row of M as in equation 3.8.
s(i) =
1000
∑
j=1
m(i, j) ( f or, i= 1, ...N) (3.8)
3.5.3 Calculating hypothetical intermediate values
Now, the attacker should calculate the hypothetical intermediate values for every
possible choice of part of key. These possible choices can be shown as matrix
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K = (k(1),k(2).....,k(B))′, where B denotes the total number of possible keys. R
denotes the length of the part of key.
Now, an attacker has the inputs, the data matrix P and the possible key matrix K,
to calculate hypothetical intermediate values as shown matrix F , where f (i, j) =
f (p(i),k( j)), where f means part of encryption or decryption algorithm for the place
that is specified in Section 3.5.1. This calculation is repeated for all data and for all
k( j) key hypotheses. After calculation, an attacker should have a matrix F of size
N×K.
Each column j of F is about the intermediate results calculated according to the key
hypothesis k( j). Only one column of F should have a correlation between the power
consumption of the cryptographic device.
3.5.4 Mapping intermediate values to the hypothetical power consumption values
An attacker has a matrix F shows the hypothetical intermediate values. An
attacker should use a technique or theory to find a hypothetical power consumption
values, a matrix H, from the hypothetical intermediate values. There are some
models to convert the F matrix to the H matrix like Hamming-weight model or
Hamming-Distance model. In Hamming weight model, H matrix is calculated as
h(i, j) = number o f ones in f (i, j).
3.5.5 Comparing the hypothetical power consumption values with the power
traces
The final step for DPA is to find the correlation between the matrix S and each column
of the matrix H. In theory, the correlation between the power consumption and the
column about the correct key should be the biggest one. Thus, the key can be revealed.
3.6 Correlation Power Analysis
All the steps in DPA are for finding out the data dependency of the power consumption
of cryptographic devices. It can be achieved by analyzing the power consumption of
cryptographic device at a fixed moment of time as a function of the processed data and
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the key. The correlation power analysis(CPA) [22] is a kind of mathematical technique
to withdraw the correct key by using correlation coefficient of statistics.
In DPA attack, the adversary has lots of power traces, corresponding plaintexts or
ciphertexts and hypothetical intermediate values. The correlation coefficient γX ,Y
between two random variables X and Y with their expected values µX and µY , and
standard deviations σX and σY is defined as equation 3.9:
γX ,Y =
Cov(X ,Y )
σXσY
=
E ((X−µX)(Y −µY ))√
D(X)
√
D(Y )
(3.9)
Where E is the expected value operator and Cov refers to covariance. The result of
equation 3.9 indicates the linear relationship between two random variables and the
absolute value of correlation coefficient γX ,Y is between 0 and 1. If γX ,Y equals to 1,
it means that there is a perfect match between two random variables. On the other
hand, if it equals to 0, it means that there is no relationship between them, they are
totally randomly chosen. Therefore, the higher the absolute value of γX ,Y is, the better
linearity between random variables X and Y .
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4. MEASUREMENT SETUP
The main goal for this thesis is to find the secret key of Tiny Encryption Algorithm.
Although it can be done many different ways, The Power Analysis Attack is chosen.
Therefore, Sasebo-GII board is chosen to measure the power consumption of the
cryptographic device. In addition to that, an oscilloscope is needed to observe and
collect the power traces. Moreover, communication channels are opened between the
computer and the oscilloscope, between the computer and the Sasebo-GII board. The
basic measurement setup can be seen in Figure 4.1.
4.1 Sasebo GII Board
It is a special board for the purpose of side-channel attack experiments. It can measure
the power consumption, thus the attacker does not need any additional circuit to
measure the power consumption. The main specification of the Sasebo GII board that
is shown in Figure 4.2 can be listed as below.
• It has two Xilinx FPGAs and they are connected to each other through a
38-bit general-purpose input/output common bus with fully-flexibility in signal
assignment.
Oscilloscope
Sasebo Gll
Computer
USB
UART
Trigger V (R)
Figure 4.1: Measurement Setup
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Switch 3 
J2 
TP3 
JP2 
JP1 
Figure 4.2: Sasebo GII
– Cryptographic FPGA : XC5VLX50 - 1FFG324 (Virtex-5 series)
– Control FPGA : XC3S400A - 4FTG256 (Spartan-3A series)
• The board has an oscillator that provides the control FPGA with a clock signal of
24MHz. The cryptographic FPGA can get the clock signal over the control FPGA.
Moreover, for both of them, an external clock input is also supported.
• External power source supplies the on_board power regulators, and the FPGAs with
5.0 V . The power regulators convert the 5-V input into 3.0 V , 1.8 V , 1.2 V , and 1.0
V for the FPGAs. The core voltage of 1.0V of the cryptographic FPGA can also be
applied directly through the external power connector.
• It has shunt resistors to measure power consumption and they are located on the
core VDD or ground lines of the cryptographic FPGA.
• Each of these FPGAs are connected to the flash ROMs. Therefore, programming
the flash ROMs by using FPGA configuration cable is enough to program FPGAs.
Thus, it is not necessary to reprogram FPGAs after each turning off the Sasebo
board.
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4.1.1 Setting up sasebo board
Before starting to use the Sasebo board, it should be configured as below.
• Jumper one (JP1) as shown in Figure 4.2 should be open.
• Jumper two (JP2) as shown in Figure 4.2 should be short circuit.
• Turn on 2 and 3 on switch 3 as shown in Figure 4.2, turn off the others.
• SMA−BNC cable is used to carry out measurement of power consumption of the
board and it should be connected to J2 as shown in Figure 4.2 on the board.
• The ground wire of the probe should be connected to TP3 as shown in Figure 4.2.
4.1.2 Field programmable gate arrays
A Field programmable gate array (FPGA) is an integrated circuit that consists of many
configurable logic blocks (CLBs), which can be configured to represent basic digital
design elements such as logic gates and registers. And also, the building blocks inside
of the FPGA can be connected each other as seen in Figure 4.3. In addition to that,
these connection can be re-programmed again and again. It gives the designer much
flexibility.
Input/Output Blocks
Logic Blocks
Programmable 
Interconnect
Figure 4.3: Field Programmable Gate Arrays
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A designer should use a hardware description language (HDL) to describe the
behaviour of the system that the FPGA should implement. The development tools for
FPGAs can map the HDL representation to CLBs and routed connection. The good
part of FPGA is that it gives an opportunity to the designer to design parallel systems
unlike the microcontroller. The development tool convert the HDL representation of
the design to the configuration for the FPGA and it is used to program FPGA. It can
be stored in static Random Access Memory (SRAM), Flash, erasable programmable
read only memory (EPROM) or electrically erasable programmable read only memory
(EEPROM).
As mentioned above, the Sasebo GII board has two FPGAs. One of them is for
cryptographic circuit and the other one is for to support cryptographic circuit. The
board has an ability to measure the power consumption of the cryptographic FPGA.
The Figure 4.4 shows the block diagram of the cryptographic FPGA. There are 4
modules except from the Mainmodule such as UAR, UAT , gather and TEA.
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Figure 4.4: Block diagram of cryptographic FPGA
UAR and UAT are the parts of UART and they manage to send and receive data
between Matlab and FPGA. The UAR receives 8 bits in one time and save it until
the new bits come. UAT can send 8 bits in order when sendbyte is set to logic high
by Mainprogram. Module gather collects the output of UAR and when its size equals
to 64 bits, it sets Plaintextready to high logic. Thus, the Mainprogram can understand
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that the plaintext is ready for the encryption. TEA encrypts the plaintexts. It sets
done logic high when the encryption ends. Mainprogram is designed for managing
the other modules and coordination. The IO signals of FPGA reach the modules over
Mainprogram. The data receive via RxD to UAR and UAT send the bits via tx. The
start and run inputs are connected to switches and they provide the state machine starts
in the beginning. The Select input is set by control FPGA to see the ciphertext via the
output Teaout put. The trigger is set to logic high when encryption starts. Sendbyte
shows whether or not UAT sends data. The plaintextready shows whether or not the
plaintext comes and ready means everything is ready for encryption.
4.2 Oscilloscope
The DSO6104A Agilent oscilloscope is used to observe the power consumption. It
has 1 GHz bandwidth and 4 GSa/s. In addition, it has 4 analog channel, unfortunately
no digital channel. Before stating the measurement, the oscilloscope should be set
up. Agilent546XX driver is used in Matlab Test and Measurement Tool to set up the
oscilloscope.
• deviceObj = icdevice(’Agilent546XX.mdd’, ’USB0::0x0957::0x1754::
MY44003791::0::INSTR’); // create a device object, Agilent546XX.mdd is
the driver, USB0::0x0957::0x1754:: MY44003791::0::INSTR is the address of the
oscilloscope.
• connect(deviceObj); // connect device object to hardware
• devicereset(deviceObj); // resets the instrument associated with device object.
• get = get(deviceObj, ’Initialized’); // Initialized is True between a successful call
to the Initialize method and a successful call to the Close method, and False at all
other times
• set(deviceObj.Acquisition(1), ’AcquisitionType’ ,’Agi-
lent546XXAcquisitionTypeNormal’); // configure property value, it Specifies
how the oscilloscope acquires data and fills the waveform record
• set(deviceObj.Acquisition(1), ’NumberOfPointsMin’, 1000); // The minimum
number of points required in the waveform record for each channel
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• set(deviceObj.Acquisition(1), ’StartTime’, 1e-007); // The length of time from the
trigger event to the first point in the waveform record in seconds.
• set(deviceObj.Acquisition(1), ’TimePerRecord’, 4.3e-006); // The length of time in
seconds that corresponds to the record length
• set(deviceObj.Channel(1), ’Enabled’, ’off’); // If True, the oscilloscope acquires a
waveform for the channel.
• set(deviceObj.Channel(2), ’Enabled’, ’off’);
• set(deviceObj.Channel(3), ’Enabled’, ’off’);
• set(deviceObj.Channel(4), ’Enabled’, ’off’);
• set up for Channel 1
– set(deviceObj.Channel(1), ’Enabled’, ’on’);
– set(deviceObj.Channel(1), ’InputImpedance’, 1000000); // The input
impedance for the channel in Ohms.
– set(deviceObj.Channel(1), ’Invert’, ’off’); // If True, the oscilloscope displays
the waveform inverted for the channel.
– set(deviceObj.Channel(1), ’Offset’, 0); // The location of the center of the
range that the Vertical Range attribute specifies for the selected channel. The
value is with respect to ground and is in volts.
– set(deviceObj.Channel(1), ’ProbeSkew’, 0); // The skew factor (in seconds)
that the probe is delaying the signal as it propagates through the probe
– set(deviceObj.Channel(1), ’Range’, 0.2); // The absolute value in Volts of the
full-scale input range for a channel.
– set(deviceObj.Channel(1), ’Units’, ’Agilent546XXVolts’); // The units used
for the channels.
• set up for Channel 2
– set(deviceObj.Channel(2), ’Enabled’, ’on’);
– set(deviceObj.Channel(2), ’InputImpedance’, 1000000); // The input
impedance for the channel in Ohms.
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– set(deviceObj.Channel(2), ’Invert’, ’off’); // If True, the oscilloscope displays
the waveform inverted for the channel.
– set(deviceObj.Channel(2), ’Offset’, 0); // The location of the center of the
range that the Vertical Range attribute specifies for the selected channel. The
value is with respect to ground and is in volts.
– set(deviceObj.Channel(2), ’ProbeSkew’, 0); // The skew factor (in seconds)
that the probe is delaying the signal as it propagates through the probe
– set(deviceObj.Channel(2), ’Range’, 16); // The absolute value in Volts of the
full-scale input range for a channel.
– set(deviceObj.Channel(2), ’Units’, ’Agilent546XXVolts’); // The units used
for the channels.
• set up for Channel 4
– set(deviceObj.Trigger(1), ’Source’, ’channel4’); // The source the oscillo-
scope monitors for the trigger event.
– set(deviceObj.Trigger(1), ’Continuous’, ’on’); // If True, the oscilloscope
continuously initiates waveform acquisition.
– set(deviceObj.Trigger(1), ’Level’, 2); // The voltage threshold for the trigger
sub-system.
– set(deviceObj.Trigger(1), ’TriggerType’, ’Agilent546XXTriggerEdge’);
//The type of event that triggers the oscilloscope.
– set(deviceObj.Channel(4), ’Enabled’, ’on’);
– set(deviceObj.Channel(4), ’InputImpedance’, 1000000); // The input
impedance for the channel in Ohms.
– set(deviceObj.Channel(4), ’Invert’, ’off’); // If True, the oscilloscope displays
the waveform inverted for the channel.
– set(deviceObj.Channel(4), ’Offset’, 0); // The location of the center of the
range that the Vertical Range attribute specifies for the selected channel. The
value is with respect to ground and is in volts.
– set(deviceObj.Channel(4), ’ProbeSkew’, 0); // The skew factor (in seconds)
that the probe is delaying the signal as it propagates through the probe
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– set(deviceObj.Channel(4), ’Range’, 8); // The absolute value in Volts of the
full-scale input range for a channel.
– set(deviceObj.Channel(4), ’Units’, ’Agilent546XXVolts’); // The units used
for the channels.
4.3 Communication
We have three basic tools for measurement setup as computer, oscilloscope and Sasebo
GII board. We need to control Sasebo GII board and oscilloscope by using computer.
Therefore, we have to connect them to the computer to communicate.
The serial communication is chosen for communication between cryptographic FPGA
of the sasebo board and computer. Therefore, the Matlab program [23] and Universal
Asynchronous Receiver-Transmitter (UART) [24] protocol are used to send and get
data. The Matlab program is chosen because it is used also to get the power traces
from the oscilloscope. The Matlab program can connect to the oscilloscope via an
Universal Serial Bus (USB). Thus, the specification of the oscilloscope can be set up
via computer.
The UART module can be divided into two parts as the transmit and receive parts.
These parts work independently, but they do not work at the same time during the
communication between the Sasebo board and the Matlab, so it is not a problem.
In asynchronous transmitting, UART firstly send a start bit, then eight data bits,
least-significant-bit first, and finally one stop bit. The data-line’s idle state is high logic
so the start bit is low logic and the stop bit is high logic. In asynchronous receiving part,
the start bit and stop bit are determined according to the asynchronous transmitting part
so they are the same. The baud rate of the UART is set to 9600 bps.
4.4 Workflow
There are some steps to get power traces from the oscilloscope for a specific plaintext.
• The oscilloscope should be prepared for the measurement according to parameters
that specified in Section 4.2.
• Then, 1000 plaintexts is created randomly by Matlab and each of them is 64 bits.
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– P=round(rand(1000,64)); // round=round the closest integer, rand=create
uniformly distributed pseudorandom numbers, and return 1000×64 P matrix.
• The plaintext is sent to the Sasebo board by using UART so each time 8 bits are
sent. These 8 bits can be sent after converting them to decimal.
– p1=P(1:1000,1:8); // the least significant bits are grouped into p1.
– p1=bi2de(p1); // from binary to decimal
– p2=P(1:1000,9:16);
– p2=bi2de(p2);
– p3=P(1:1000,17:24);
– p3=bi2de(p3);
– p4=P(1:1000,25:32);
– p4=bi2de(p4);
– p5=P(1:1000,33:40);
– p5=bi2de(p5);
– p6=P(1:1000,41:48);
– p6=bi2de(p6);
– p7=P(1:1000,49:56);
– p7=bi2de(p7);
– p8=P(1:1000,57:64);
– p8=bi2de(p8); // now P matrix is split into 8 equal size matrixes. It’s time to
send the first plaintext. Therefore, a communication channel should be open.
– s=serial(’com2’); // s is created as serial port object for port com2.
– fopen(s); // fopen connects the serial port object, s, to the device.
– fwrite(s,p1(1),’uint8’,’async’); // fwrite is to write binary data to device, uint8
means 8 bits unsigned integer, async means asynchronous mode controls the
command line.
– fwrite(s,p2(1),’uint8’,’async’);
– fwrite(s,p3(1),’uint8’,’async’);
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– fwrite(s,p4(1),’uint8’,’async’);
– fwrite(s,p5(1),’uint8’,’async’);
– fwrite(s,p6(1),’uint8’,’async’);
– fwrite(s,p7(1),’uint8’,’async’);
– fwrite(s,p8(1),’uint8’,’async’);
• The cryptographic FPGA collects these bits and then send 3 as a byte to the
computer to declare that the plaintext is received successfully.
• The matlab is waiting for the byte that coming from UART.
– while(s.bytesavailable==0) // until the byte is sent, the loop continues.
– end
– a=fread(s) // fread reads binary data from device.
– if(a==3)
– fwrite(s,1,’uint8’,’async’) // it is the start signal for encryption
– end
• The cryptographic FPGA reads the receiving byte and if it is expected byte, the
TEA starts encryption for the plaintext and at the same time the trigger is set to
logic high until it finishes encryption.
• After encryption is completed, FPGA sends 255 as a byte to the Matlab via UART
to inform the finish of encryption.
• The Matlab waits for the byte coming from UART.
– while(s.bytesavailable==0)
– end // after byte comes, the loop ends
– a=fread(s)
– if(a==255)
– set(deviceObj.Trigger(1), ’Continuous’, ’off’); // set is a function,
deviceObj.Trigger(1) is object and it is necessary for measurements.
28
– [m(1)]=invoke(groupObj,’FetchWaveform’,’Channel1’); // invoke is a
function to get data from oscilloscope.
– file=fopen(’M.txt’,’a’); // M.txt is created if not exist.
– fprintf(file,’1.7f ’,m(1)); // it saves the m(1) to the M.txt.
– fclose(file);
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5. RESULTS
Differential Power Analysis is used to find the correlation between the power
consumption of the cryptographic FPGA and the power estimation related to the point
of the key. It is a passive attack so just the power consumption of the cryptographic
circuit is observed. The basic theory behind DPA is that there is a linear correlation
between the power consumption of the computational logic and the internal bit
transitions.
As explained in Section 3.5 complementary-Metal-Oxide-Semiconductor technology
is used in nearly every digital circuit. If a CMOS gate changes its state, this change
causes current consumption which can be measured at the Vdd or Vss pin. There is
a linear ratio between the power dissipation and the amount of the state change. In a
synchronous design, gates are clocked which means that all gates change their state at
the same time.
5.1 Hamming Weight Power Model
The Hamming weight (Hw) [25] model says that the digital circuit consume an amount
of power that is proportional to the number of bits that are switched on within that bus.
It can be seen in Figure 5.1. If no bits are switched on, the register will consume very
little power compared to a register with all bits switched on. Therefore, it accepts that
the circuit consume the power when the output of a CMOS is shifted from low level
to high level or from high level to high level. The other possibilities are disregarded.
It is the most basic power consumption model and the attacker does not need to know
every detail about the cryptographic circuit.
This method is not efficient enough to get the secret key in many situations because the
assumptions that it accepts have much effect on power consumption. If the adversary
has some information about the cryptographic algorithm, Hamming distance power
model is more suitable [25].
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Data Bus
0  0  0  0  0  1  0  0
Consumes “1” Unit 
Power
Data Bus
0  0  1  1  0  1  1  1
Consumes “5” Units 
Power
Figure 5.1: Hamming Weight Power Model
5.2 Hamming Distance Power Model
Unlike the Hamming weight model, the important factor for the Hamming distance
model [26] is the number of changed bit. We showed the power consumption of
CMOS circuit in Section 3.5 and as signified Equations 3.1, 3.4, 3.5, 3.6, 3.7 number
of changed bit is related to the power consumption.
It tries to find a correlation between the number of changed bits and the power
consumption. It is an extension of the Hamming weight model. The important things
are initial value of a register and next value of the register. The hamming weight of a
register can be calculated by XOR operation of the initial and next value of the register
as Figure 5.2.
Register Initial Value
11001000
00010001
Register Next Value
11011001
Figure 5.2: Hamming Distance Power Model
There are some ignorance about the Hamming distance power model. They can be
listed as below;
• It assumes that the bit changes in a logic value consume the same power
consumption for the change from low level to high level or from high level to low
level.
• It ignores the power consumption when the logic value of a bit does not change.
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Even the assumptions, the Hamming distance model provides a very convenient
method for determining the expected power consumption of a circuit during a certain
time frame.
5.3 Differential Power Analysis of TEA
First step for DPA is choosing an intermediate result of the executed algorithm as in
Section 3.5.1.
• We determine a specific register for DPA and it is the output of the addition of K [0]
and one halve of the plaintext in Figure 5.3. The original architecture of TEA does
not have any register at this point, but for DPA we need to a register at that point.
Therefore we add a register there. It causes the necessity of adding some other
registers at the points seen in Figure 5.3.
• The register has 32 bits,but it is too long to attack. Therefore, we attacked the least
significant 8 bits of it.
<< 4
>> 5
K[0]
K[1]
Delta[i]
<< 4
>> 5
K[2]
K[3]
Delta[i]
Left[i] Right[i]
Right[i+1]
Left[i+1]
Register 
1
Register 
2
Register 
3
Register 
4
Register 
6
Register 
5
Figure 5.3: One round of TEA with added registers
Second step is measuring the power consumption as in Section 3.5.2.
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• Firstly, we used the Matlab to create randomly 1000 plaintexts. Each of them
consists of 64 bits so now we have a P matrix with 1000 rows and 64 columns
(1000×64). The first row of P matrix is p(1) and is can be seen in Figure 5.4.
Figure 5.4: p(1), the least significant bit→ the most significant bit
• We record the plaintexts and then send one of them to the Sasebo board by using
UART. The bits are sent from the least significant bits to the most significant
bits. Every time one byte can be sent via UART so p(i) is split into 8 bytes.
p(1)=[p1(1),p2(1),p3(1),p4(1),p5(1),p6(1),p7(1),p8(1)]
• After some data transfer between the computer and Sasebo board according to 4.4,
the board starts to encrypt the plaintext and at the same the trigger is set to logic
high. After the encryption ends, the FPGA sends a specific byte to the Matlab, and
Matlab starts to get power data points from the oscilloscope.
• We captured the power consumption of the cryptographic device for the known
plaintext and it consists of 1000 data points. The power consumption can be seen in
Figure 5.5, the trigger signal can be seen in Figure 5.6, and the clock signal can be
seen in 5.7. The trigger is set to logic high during the encryption of TEA and it takes
96 clock cycle. It means that there are around 10 data points for every clock cycle.
The clock signal can not be observed clearly because 10 data points are not enough
to get clear result. On the other hand, it is a problem for the power measurement,
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too. Therefore, we focus on the clock cycle that the register 1 is loaded. It is the
first two clock cycles after trigger is set to high logic. The data points for power
consumption can be seen in Figure 5.8 and the clock cycles can be seen in Figure
5.9.
Figure 5.5: The power consumption
Figure 5.6: The trigger
• We apply the same method for all plaintexts so we get a M matrix with 1000 rows
and 1000 columns (1000×1000). Therefore, m(i, j) shows the voltage value of the
power traces for p(i) at time j. As an example, m(1) can be seen in Figure 5.10.
Third step is calculating hypothetical intermediate values as in Section 3.5.3.
• Before addition operator, the plaintext should be shifted to left four times as shown
in Figure 5.3. Therefore, we shifted the halves of the all plaintexts four times. Then
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Figure 5.7: The clock signal
Figure 5.8: Power consumption
the least significant 8 bits of them are summed with the least significant 8 bits of
K [0]. This operation are iterated for all possible K [0] values. In the end, we have
a F matrix with 1000 rows and 8× 28 columns (1000×2048). The first row of F
can be seen in Figure 5.11. However, in Figure 5.11, F matrix with 1000 rows and
28 columns since each 8 bits are converted to byte for better understanding. The
output of shift operator is summed with all possible partial key values from 0 to
255, so the result increases 1 for each possible key values if they are in order as in
Figure 5.11.
Fourth step is mapping intermediate values to power consumption values as in Section
3.5.4.
• The Hamming-weight model is chosen to convert the hypothetical intermediate
values to the hypothetical power consumption values. We calculate a H matrix by
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Figure 5.9: The clock signal
Figure 5.10: Power measurement for m(1)
counting the number of logic high bits for every byte in every row in the F matrix.
Now, we have the H matrix with 1000 rows and 28 columns (1000×256). h(i, j)
shows the hamming-weight of i.th plaintext for the key value j. The first row of H
matrix can be seen in Figure 5.12. The hypothetical power consumption values are
between 0 and 8 because we count the number of bits that changed in a byte.
Final step is comparing the hypothetical power consumption values with the power
traces as in Section 3.5.5.
• It’s time to find the correlation between the M matrix and each column of the H
matrix. Therefore, we convert the M matrix to S matrix according to Equation5.1.
Thus, 1000 data points convert into one point for every plaintexts.
• Then we used corrcoe f f function in Matlab to find the correlation between the S
matrix and each column of H matrix. After that, we get aC matrix with 1 row and 28
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Figure 5.11: Hypothetical intermediate values
Figure 5.12: Mapping intermediate values to power consumption values
columns (1×256). c(i) shows the correlation value of the power consumption and
the hypothetical power consumption value of the partial key value i. The correlation
value about the correct key should be the biggest.
s(i) =
1000
∑
j=1
m(i, j) ( f or, i= 1, ...1000) (5.1)
The correlation result can be seen in Figure 5.13. The correct key value is zero so it
can be seen that it has the biggest correlation value. On the other hand, there are some
other key values that has the same correlation value. It is because of the algorithm.
The register that we attacked sums a part of key and a halve of the plaintext, but before
summation the plaintext shift left side four times. Therefore the least significant bits of
all plaintexts are zero. As a consequences, sixteen possible partial keys have the same
correlation value.
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Figure 5.13: The correlation between power consumption and the guessed keys
On the other hand, The correlation value for the correct key is not so big and close to
+1 or -1, because we attacked over just 8 bits. However, in the same clock cycle, at
least 320 bits can change their values because the architecture of the TEA has lots of
asynchronous parts. A small change in a register can effect lots of register in the same
clock cycle.
Therefore, we got rid of the other parts of the algorithm as shown in Figure 5.15 to
show that if the number of bits that has the possibility of changing in the same clock
cycle decreases, we can calculate bigger correlation value. The result can be seen in
Figure 5.14. We have a bigger correlation value now, because in this design, 32 bits
can be change in the clock cycle that we attacked.
Figure 5.14: The correlation between power consumption and the guessed keys
Then, the partial key value is changed from zero to 255. The result can be seen in
Figure 5.16. The correct key has the biggest correlation value, but as expected there
39
<< 4
K[0]
Right[i]
Register
Figure 5.15: The Trimmed TEA
are some other keys have the same correlation values. This problem causes not to
determine the correct key value.
Figure 5.16: The correlation between power consumption and the guessed keys
Even the correlation values calculated for the small part of TEA were quite reasonable,
the correlation values for whole TEA were not as expected. The reasons can be listed
as below.
• We attack just for 8 bits, but at the same clock cycle, more than 300 bits can change
their state because of the architecture of TEA.
• We assume that the register that we attack is hold on logic low, but maybe it is not.
Therefore, the Hamming distance of it can be different and it effects the hypothetical
intermediate values.
• We assume that the power consumption is just related to the number of changed
bits, but in reality the bit that stays the previous state also consume some power as
in Equation3.1.
• Also, various noise components can effect the voltage values.
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6. CONCLUSION
The main purpose is the differential power analysis attack on an FPGA implementation
of TEA. Therefore, we used the Sasebo board for implementation of TEA. The
advantage of the Sasebo is that it can measure the power consumption. It helps us to
prepare measurement setup. Except from the Sasebo board, we need the oscilloscope
and a computer to control the oscilloscope and the Sasebo board. The Matlab is used
to control them because it has specific driver for oscilloscope. Thus, we can able to set
up the oscilloscope easily. After measurement setup is ready, we recorded the power
consumption for known plaintexts for DPA.
In the original implementation of TEA, there is no register on the point that we want
to attack so we add some registers to the architecture as in Figure 5.3. These registers
makes the implementation three times slower, but it is not important for us. We attack
the least significant 8 bits of this register and the correlation result can be seen in Figure
5.13. The correct key value is zero so it can be seen that it has the biggest correlation
value. However, some other key values has the same correlation value. It is because
of the algorithm. Before addition, the plaintext is shifted left four times so the least
significant 4 bits of the plaintexts are the same. Thus, the correlation values are the
same for 16 guessed keys.
On the other hand, the absolute value of correlation should be close to 1. Even we get
the biggest correlation value for the right key, it is not close to 1. The reasons are listed
in Section 5.3. Therefore, we attack on a small part of the algorithm and we get the
expected result. Now, we calculate bigger correlation value for the right key and it is
the biggest one when comparing it the other correlation values for the other keys.
In conclusion, we attack on an FPGA implementation of TEA. We used the Hamming
distance method which says that there is a linear ratio between the power consumption
and the number of bits that changed their states. We calculated the correlation values
for every possible partial keys and we observed that the correlation value for the right
partial key is the biggest. However, the value of it is not expected level. We expect to
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get close to 1, but it is close to 0,1. Therefore, we attack again, but this time we trim
the design as in Figure 5.15. Thus, we get the bigger correlation value for the right
partial key. It is around 0.45. It shows that DPA attack on an FPGA implementation
of TEA is possible. On the other hand, we couldn’t reveal the exact key value. We just
find a group that the correct key is inside so determining the exact key can be further
work.
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